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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
The West Virginia court in following this second line of
authority purports to distinguish the Ness case on the basis of a
slight difference in the wording of the incontestability clause."
At the same time, however, it recognizes that there are cases in-
volving an incontestability clause identical with the one in the
principal case which nevertheless adopt the view of the Ness case.
This tends to show that the court in fact rejected the Ness case, and
would probably reach the same result regardless of the wording of
the clause.
J. L. G., Jr.
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - AyTm-AcQuiRED PROPERTY. - In
executing his will, the testator devised to his second wife and his
children by her, "all of my real estate, consisting of three certain
tracts or parcels of land situated in Walton District .... contain-
ing in all about 109 acres." Before his death he acquired two addi-
tional tracts in the same Walton district, comprising about 102
acres. The children of his first marriage, to whom he bequeathed
one dollar each, claimed that he died intestate as to the two tracts
he acquired after executing his will. Held, one judge dissenting,
that after-acquired property does not pass under a specific devise
when the description is not sufficiently broad to include the prop-
erty. Jarvis v. Jarvis.1
A West Virginia statute provides: "A will shall be construed,
with reference to the estate comprised in it, to speak and take
effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of
the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will."'
The court envisioned the testator as looking over the will at the time
of his death and finding that the "three certain tracts .... of land
containing . . . . 109 acres" could not mean five certain tracts
aggregating 211 acres. The majority opinion relied upon McComb
v. McCombY where the testator devised to his sons "all my real
o "Incontestability.-Except for non-payment of premiums and except for
the restrictions and provisions applying to the Double Indemnity and Dis-
ability Benefits as provided in Sections 1 and 3 respectively, this Policy shall
be incontestable after one year from its date of issue . . .I Ness v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). The important words of the
incontestability clause in the principal case are, ". ... except as to provisions
and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits."
1 3 S. E. (2d) 619 (W. Va. 1939). The clause relating to the one dollar
bequest does not appear in the court's opinion, but is taken from the record
of the circuit court.
2W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 41, art. 3, § 1.
2 200 S. E. 49 (W. Va. 1939).
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estate .... on the East side of Main Street between Fourth and
Fifth Streets." This was held to be a specific devise, and did not
pass after-acquired property situated on the east side of Main
Street between Fifth and Sixth Streets.4
The argument of the dissenting judge in the principal case
was that "three certain tracts . . . of land containing . . .. 109
acres" was intended to be subordinate to, and controlled by the
phrase "all of my real estate," and based his view on the case of
Dearing v. Selvey5 where the testator devised "my home farm of
about 152/2 acres to my wife," and upon the wife's death "said
home farm of about 1521/ acres" was to be sold by the executor
and the proceeds divided among nine children. Three after-
acquired tracts, including one acre of coal were held to pass under
the will, to be sold by the executor.
A pertinent Virginia decision is that of Honaker v. Starks'
wherein testator bequeathed "my stock (one share)" and later
acquired four more shares. All five shares passed, the court stating
that where the subject matter is sufficiently ascertained, as here by
the use of the words "my stock", then added particulars of
description which are false or mistaken will be rejected.
Under the common law, property acquired by the testator
after the execution of his will did not pass unless there was a re-
publication of the will.7  This rule has been changed by statutes
of varying constructions.8 An act of the Virginia Legislature of
17859 was construed to allow a devise of after-acquired property
only if the language of the will showed the intention of the testa-
tor to dispose of such land.10  In 1849 this provision was changed,"
and like the present West Virginia statute, provides that all the
property owned by the testator at his death passes under the devise
unless a contrary intention appears by the will.12 Thus, the court
4 It should be noted that in the McComb case the subject matter of the
devise is certain restricted property, whereas the subject matter of the Jarvis
case is "Iall of my real estate" which is set off by a comma from the modifying
descriptive phrase which follows.
5 50 W. Va. 4, 40 S. E. 478 (1901).
6 114 Va. 37, 75 S. E. 741 (1912).
7 Note (1921) 28 R. C. L. § 204.
8 69 C. J. 368 § 1384; Dockery's Ex'rs v. Dockery, 170 Ky. 194, 185 S. W.
849 (1916); Miller v. Bower, 260 Pa. 349, 103 Atl. 729 (1918); Pray v. Water-
ston, 12 Mete. 262 (Mass. 1847).
9 12 STAT. 138, 140 (1787).
:1 Allen v. Harrison, 3 Call 289 (Va. 1802).
1 VA. REv. CODE (1849) e. 122, § 11.
12 Raines v. Barker, 13 Gratt. 128 (Va. 1856) ; Dearing v. Selvey, 50 W. Va.
4, 40 S. E. 478 (1901).
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in the principal case, by reaffirming the rule laid down in the
McCOmb case that "the description is not sufficiently broad to in-
clude the property in question" is, in effect, interpreting the will
under the construction 3 of the old Virginia statute.'14
Whether or not the qualifying phrase "three certain tracts
... . containing 109 acres" is evidence of the "contrary inten-
tion" appearing in the statute, would depend, in a close case, on
the general tenor of the will. Various authorities on similar facts
hold both ways,15 probably on the strength of such facts, and not.
merely on the abstract question of contrary intention. The court
will interpret certain words and phrases used by keeping in mind
the whole scheme and general intent of the will, which intent
technical rules of construction should not be allowed to defeat. 6
In the case of Runyon v. Mills 7 the testator bequeathed and
13 Holding that a restrictive description indicates the "contrary intention"
stated in the statute: Wootton v. Redd's Ex'rs, 12 Gratt. 196 (Va. 1855);
of. Totten v. Dawson, 104 W. Va. 274, 139 S. E. 858 (1927). But see 1
HARnisoN, WiLLs (2d ed. 1928) 1439, for a case where after-acquired prop-
erty will pass where the will, "taken as a whole, does not show an intention
not to devise it."
Criticizing such restrictive interpretations as in the principal case, Dean
Pound states that a "strict and narrow interpretation . . . represents the
orthodox common law attitude toward legislative innovations." Pound, Com-
non. Law and Legislation (1909) 21 Hazv. L. REv. 383, 385. The object of
these will construction statutes was "to abolish a rule of law which, in most
instances . . . defeated the intention of those who devised all their estates
." Pray v. Waterston, 12 Mete. 262, 265 (Mass. 1847).
14 However, statements of quantity are seldom given much weight. Honaker
v. Starks, 114 Va. 37, 75 S. E. 741 (1912).
15 After-acquired property passes under the will: Dickerson's Appeal, 55
Conn. 223, 10 Atl. 194, 15 Atl. 99 (1887); Sussex Trust Co. v. Polite, 12 Del.
Ch. 64, 106 Atl. 54 (1919); Woman's U. M. Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338, 23 N. E.
603 (1890); Haley v. Gatewood, 74 Tex. 281, 12 S. W. 25 (1889); Honaker v.
Starks, 114 Va. 37, 75 S. E. 741 (1912) (personalty). With a statute similar
to that of West Virginia, the North Carolina court has -held that where the
testator devised lands south of a certain line "containing by estimation 200
acres", after-acquired property south of said line passed by the will: Brown
v. Hamilton, 135 N. C. 10, 47 S. E. 128 (1904). A more recent case is Holmes
v. York, 203 N. 0. 709, 166 S. B. 889 (1932). But of. Hines v. Mercer, 125 N.
0. 71, 34 S. E. 106 (1899).
Holding that after-acquired property did not pass by the will: Wheeler v.
Brewster, 68 Conn. 177, 36 Atl. 32 (1896); Gray v. Garnett, 148 Ky. 34, 146
S. W. 18 (1912); of. Dockery's Ex'rs v. Dockery, 170 Ky. 194, 185 S. W. 849
(1916) wherein the court was moved by the intention of the testator to divide
the property evenly. A gift of testator's realty, followed by a statement that
his realty consists of certain items of property which are specified, is a specific
devise and does not pass after-acquired realty. Allison v. Hitchcock, 309 Mo.
488, 274 S. W. 798 (1925).
16 Hinton v. Milburn's Bx'rs, 23 W. Va. 166 (1883); Rutter v. Anderson,
48 W. Va. 215, 36 S. E. 357 (1900) ; Bartlett v. Petty, 93 W. Va. 608, 117 S. E.
551 (1923).
17 86 W, Va, 388, 103 S. E. 112 (1920),
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devised his property to his second wife and children, and included
only one of his first wife's children. To the children of the first
wife he gave one dollar each. The court held "The testator has here
clearly shown, by necessary implication, his intention to give all his
property to his children by his last wife, as a class." The court
further stated that this implication need not be absolutely irre-
sistible but only such as satisfies the mind of the court of the inten-
tion of the testator. Apparently in the principal case, the mind
of the court was not satisfied as to the intention, even though the
plaintiffs in this case were children of the testator's first wife, to
whom he had bequeathed one dollar each. It would seem that the
real intent of the testator was to exclude his first children from his
property, which could have been made effective by the court's
application of the presumption against intestacy.18
However, the court does not necessarily pursue the real or
true intent of the testator. "In interpretation of a will, the true
inquiry is not what the testator meant to express, but what do the
words used express." 19  "It is not, what did he mean? but it is,
what do his words mean? "20 Thus, the court may have rested the
decision on what they considered to be the apparent or indicated
intent of the testator, to limit his devise to the three certain tracts
of 109 acres. Had the real. intent as evidenced by the tenor of the
instrument and the whole scheme of the testator's devise and be-
quests been given effect, as was done in the Runyon case, then a
contrary result might have been reached.2
J. S. M.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - F IING APPLICATION WITHIN
STATUTORY PERIOD. - Claimant was injured and four months later
the employer reported the injury to the state compensation commis-
sioner. Thereafter upon receipt of application forms from the
commissioner and within six months from the date of injury,
claimant went to the office of his employer, made out and signed
the application for compensation, leaving it there with the ex-
pectation that it would be promptly forwarded to the commissioner.
is" .... where two modes of interpretation are possible, that is preferred
which will prevent either total or partial intestacy", Honaker v. Starks, 114
Va. 37, 39, 57 S. E. 741 (1912). To the same effect, Carney v. Kain, 40 W.
Va. 758, 23 S. E. 650 (1895); (1921) 28 R. C. L. 227.
10 Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 313, 27 S. E. 389 (1897), quoting from
Couch v. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23 (1887).
20 Coberly v. Earle, 60 V. Va. 295, 302, 54 S. E. 336 (1906)L
211 HARRSON, WILLs & ADMmSTRATION (2d ed. 1927) 380, § 193 (2).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1939], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol46/iss1/11
